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Summary  findings
Larsen  presents  a simple  empirical  fiamework  for  The fiscal  implications  for some  countries  are significant
estimating  the level  of world fossil  fuel subsidies  and  - as much as 10 percent of C,DI)  in sorne  countries.
analyzing  their implications  for carbon dioxide  World subsidies  are estimated  to he Ilmore  than $2 1  ()
emissions.  Larsen  extends  Larsen  and Shah (1992) by  billion,  or 20 to 25 percent of the value  of world fossil
applving  a simple  model  with interfuel  substitution,  using  fuel consumption  at world prices.
a more detailed sectoral data set that includes energy  Removing such subsidies, Larsen  estimates, would
prices and consumption  for an expanded  sample  of  reduce national carbon  cmissions  by more than 20
countries.  percent relative  to baseline  emissions  in some countries.
Larsen  concludes  that substantial  fossil  fuel subsidies  It would reduce global  carbon emissions  by 7 percent.
prevail  in a hand&ul  of large carboni-emitting  countries.
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research  assistance  from Isidro Soloaga.WORLD FOSSIL FUEL SUBSIDIES  ANN GLOBAL  CARBON EMISSIONS
IN A MODEL WITH INTERFUEL  SUBSTITUTION
I. Introduction:  The last few years have witnessed  a dramatic growth in worldwide  concern
over global climate change.  Increases in atmospheric  temperatures  are expected to take place
as a result of accumulation  of so called greenhouse gases.  The magnitude of temperature
increases and the environmental  and economic  costs are still highly uncertain and are likely to
differ substantially  across regions.  The main greenhouse gases are carbon dioxide (C02),
methane, CFCs and nitrogen  oxides, of which  carbon  dioxide  accounts  for as much as 80 percent
of the total warming potential on a global scale when adjusting the instantaneous warming
potential  by the atmospheric  lifetime of the gases (Nordhaus 1991)'.
Most OECD  countries  have already comrmitted  to stabilize  C02 emissions  at 1990 levels
by year 2000, and some western European countries  to further reduce emissions 20% by year
20052.  Non-OECD countries are  reluctant to  reduce emissions on  global enviromnental
'The instantaneous  warming potential  of a gas is defined  as the increase in atmospheric
concentration  of a gas times the instantaneous  or current radiative  impact of that gas.  The total
warming potential of a gas is the sum of the instantaneous  warming potential over each time
period for the life time of the gas.  For instance, in terns of instantaneous  warning potential,
carbon dioxide accounts  for about 53% and methane  for 17  %.  But in terms of total warming
potential, they account for 80% and 2% respectively because of significantly longer life of
carbon dioxide in the atmosphere.
2The Framework Convention  on Climate Change, signed at the "Earth Summit" in Rio
de Janeiro last summer, aims at stabilizing  atmospheric  concentrations  of greenhouse gases in
the long .erm, which  would  require a reduction  in annual  global  emissions  of approximately  50%
below current emissions. A shorter term target is a return to 1990  annual emissions levels by
year 2000 in industrial countries, while no binding constraints are  imposed on developing
countries.  Although few time specific targets are included in the treaty, mechanisms for
deciding on stronger measures  in the future, if warranted, were set up (see Steer (1992) for a
brief report on the conference in Rio).considerations  because  of more urgent development  objectives  and the fact  that the current stock
of atmosph  nissions is primarily  a "responsibility"  of the OECD  countries 3. Nevertheless,
non-OECDs, and particularly the states of the forrrer Soviet Uniop and eastern Europe, may
achieve substantial reductions relative to "busiress as usual" over the next 10 to 20 years by
policies that mak,e  econominc  and local environmental  sense.  Such policies include removal of
substantial subsidies on fossil fuels and fossil fuel generated  electricity, removal of non-price
barriers to e-nergy  efficiency, a  "moderate" tax on fossil fuels based on local environmental
considerations,  and a reorientation  of the fiscal tax structure to reduce  disincentives  to invest in
productive capital and increase incentives  to reduce use of inputs and production factors that
pollute locally and globally (see Larsen and Shah 1992a, 1992c and Shah and Larsen 1992a,
19925).
The removal  of fossil fuel subsidies has been advocated  as the first order of priority in
instituting economic  policies to protect local and global environments  (see Summers, 1991,
Churchill and Saunders, 1991, Larsen and S"-h,  1992a, 1992b, 1992c and Shah and Larsen,
1992a, 1992b).  Elimination of fossil fuel subsidies can be a politically sensitive issue, in
particular  when prices are only a small fraction  of world prices. But many developing  countries
do price fossil fuel at or above world prices, suggesting  that fossil fuel pricing reforms can be
done if introduced  gradually. In this context, it would  be helpful to quantify the magnitude  of
existing subsidies and potential  environmental  benefits associated  with the elimination of such
subsidies. A number of recent studies have reflected  upon various aspects of this question. For
3For instance,  contribution  to atmospheric  C02 concentration  increases  (1800-1988)  from
fossil fuel combustion  by OECD  countries  is 65  % of world total, while  current annual emissions
(1988) are "only" 45% (Grubler and Nakicenovic  1992).
2exampL, Kosmo (1989) estimates the level of subsidies for a  large sample of developing
countries primariiy for petroleum  products  and electricity. Sterner (1989) presents a time series
of domestic petroleum product prices relative to world prices for Latin American countries.
Burgess (1990) evaluates  potential  carbon  dioxide  emission reductions from efficient electricity
pricing in a sample of countries including  the United  States, China and India. Larsen and Shah
(1992c)  present an estimate of world fossil fuel subsidies  and the impact  of subsidy removal  on
global carbon dioxide emissions, but ignore interfuel substitutior..  This paper attempts to
account for interfuel substitution  from subsidy removal  using a more detailed data set, in most
cases from end of 1991, on fuel prices covering  a larger country sample.
Section II reviews existing fossil fuel pricing regimes and estimates  the level of world
fossil fuel subsidies.  Section III develops a simple framework for estimating the impact of
subsidy removal on national and global carbon emissions.  Estimates of carbon emission
reductions  are presented in section IV.  Section  V presents a summary and conclusions.
.I.  Existing fossil fuel pricing regimes and world subsidies:  Getting fossil fuel prices right
would prima facie represent first order of priority in any economic  policy response to curtail
greenhouse  gas emissions. This section explores this potential  by analyzing  fossil fuel pricing
practices around the world. It is interesting  to note that while a complete  inventory  of fossil fuel
subsidies in the world is a formidable task and beyond the scope of current work, yet it is
possible to reach reasonable estimate of the overall level of subsidies by studying only a few
countries.  For exam  *e,  90% of the world coal is consumed by 15 countries; almost 80% of
world petroleum pr' 1ucts by 28 countries and almost 90% of the world natural gas by  18
countries  (Table 1).  These few countries  emit a total of 85  % of global  carbon f.oom  fossil fuels,
3TABLE  1  CAWON  DIOXIDE  EHISSIONS  PROM  FOSSIL  FUEL  COMBUSTION
C02  emissiona  from  petroleum  products  (1969)  C02  emissions  from  coal  (1989)  C02  emissions  from  natural  gas  (1989)
000  *  of  world  cummulative  000  t  of  world  cuffmilative  000  % of  world  cummulative
tons  emissaons  %  tons  emissions  I  tons  emissions  I
I  UNITED  STATES  2075685  23.42t  23.42%  1 CHINA  1964032  22.41%  22.41*  1  USSR  1129996  32.60%  32.60%
2  USSR  1237842  13.97%  37.39%  2  UNITED  STATES  1826149  20.84%  43.25t  2  UNITED  STATES  924735  26.681  59.28%
3  JAPAN  603157  6.S1%  44.192  3  USSR  132885  15.16%  SS.41t  3  CANADA  128130  3.70%  62.90%
4  CHINA  292699  3.30t  47.49%  4  INDIA  461803  5.27%  63.681  4  UNITED  KINGDOM  104710  3.02%  66.00%
S  Germany,  Went  247478  2.791  50.28%  5  POLAND  370005  4.22%  67.90%  5  Germany,  West  96568  2.79%  68.70%
6  ITALY  241938  2.73%  53.01%  6  JAPAN  303995  3.47%  71.37t  6  JAPAN  92616  2.66%  71.46s
7  MEXICO  234624  2.65%  55.66%  7  Germany,  West  283623  3.24%  74.60%  7  ITALY  76926  2.22%  73.68%
8  FRANCE  214613  2.42%  56.09%  8  Germany.  East  65000  3.02%  77.63%  8  ROHANIA  66165  1.91%  75.59%
9  CANADA  209303  2.36%  60.451  9  UNITED  KIGDO4M  251277  2.87%  80.49%  9  NETHERLIUDS  64105  1.85%  77.44%
10  UNITED  KINGDOM  201560  2.27%  62.72%  10 SOUTH  AFRICA  239362  2.73%  83.23%  10  FRANCE  55964  1.611  79.05%
11  BRAZIL  146816  1.66%  64.381  11  CZECHOSLOVAKIA  156136  1.78%  85.01t  11  SAUDI  ARABIA  51270  1.48%  60.53%
12  INDIA  143929  1.62%  66.00%  12  AUSTRALIA  141932  1.62%  86.63%  12  UIcIO  49255  1.42%  61.951
13  SAUDI  ARMABIA  110261  1.24%  67.25%  13  North  KOREA  136946  1.56%  88.19%  13  ARGENTINIA  42050  1.24%  83.191
14  IRAN  110191  1.24%  68.49%  14  CANADA  107352  1.22%  89.41%  14  IRAN  42590  1.23%  84.42%
15  SPAIN  107231  1.21%  69.70%  15  South  KOREA  97037  1.11%  90.52%  15  VENEZUELA  38945  1.12%  . .54'
16  South  KOREA  103466  1.17%  70.67%  16  UNIT.  ARAB  EMIR  31210  0.90%  Os.44%
17  AUSTRALIA  81746  0.92%  71.79%  WORLD  8764288  17  AUSTRALIA  3055S  0.86s  87.321
19  INDONESIA  61722  0.92%  72.711  18  CHINA  298317  0.13%  88.16%
19  ARGENTINA  62834  0.71%  73.42%
20  EGYPT,  ARAB  REP  59349  0.67%  74.09%  WORID  3466144
21  TURKEY  56118  0.66%  74.75%
22  ROMaNIA  52439  0.59%  75.34%
23  IRAQ  50794  0.57%  75.91%
24 THAILAND  50604  0.572  76.486
25  Germany,  East  47000  0.53%  77.01%
26  VENEZUELA  46042  0.52%  71.53%
27  CZECHOSU)VAEIA  44979  0.51t  78.04%
28  POLAND  43939  0.50%  78.53%
WORLD  6863216
Source:  World  Resources  Institute  (1992)of which roughly a half of the coal and natural gas consumers and a third of the petroleum
product consumers are OECD countries with relatively insignirlcant subsidies 4. We define
subsidies on fossil fuels as the difference  between  domesJic  fossil fuel prices a-id  their (private)
opportunity cost evaluated at end-user prices.  When fuels are traded internationally  border
prices serve as  opportunity cost, which is the case for petroleum products for all sample
countries.  Opportunity cost at end-user level would be border prices plus a mark-up for
distribution. U.S. pre-tax end-user prices of petroleum  products by sector are used as proxies
for opportunity  cost at end-user level, although  unit distribution  costs may lo some extent vary
across countries. Natural  gas and coal are traded less frequently  than oil/petroleum  products and
natural gas markets are primarily  regional  in character. Border prices plus distribution  costs are
used if these fuels are imported or there exist export markets as for the formner  Soviet Union in
the case of natural gas and to a lesser extent coal 5. In the case of China, an approximation  to
the opportunity cost of coal is the unit price for the proportion of coal traded in the free
domestic market.  In the remainder of the paper opportunity  cost is referred to as world pricA
for sake of convenience.  Official exchange rates reported in IMF's  International Financial
Statistics have been used to convert domestic  prices into dollars.  Implicit subsidies stemming
from overvalued  exchange  rates are ignored  and subsidies  are thus underestimated  relative to an
4The Environment Directorate (OECD) is currently undertaking a study on producer
and consumer subsidies and other "supports" to the energy sector.  There are  significant
producer coal subsidies in Germany, but end-user prices of coal in Germany are well above
border pric-s due to import restrictions on coal.
5It  is recognized that border prices plus distribution costs as  defined here are  not
likely to be equivalent to the opportunity  cost of energy, but are used in the estimations of
subsidies because data on marginal cost of energy and domestic distribution cost are rather
scarce.  Given that the United States have the lowest pre-tax energy prices of  the OECD
countries, subsidies as calculated  are likely understated rather than overstated.
5equilibrium exchange rate.  Implicit subsidies  are for some countries larger than the subsidies
estimated  by applying  the official  exchange  rates, and estimated  carbon emission  reductions  may
in these cases be significantly  understated. Total subsidies Sk for country k evaluated at the
official exchange rate is:
Sk  =  El  Ej  (pWjj-plje)qO
vwhere  pU  is domestic end-user  price of fossil fuel i in sector j,  pwl  is opportunity  cost of fuel i
in sector j in US dollars, e is the exchange  rate in units of US dollars to domestic currency, and
qij is domestic consumption  of fuel i in sector  j6 . Total subsidies is thus the price differential
r.iultplied  by quantity consumed at subsildized  prices.  Price elasticity of demand need not be
applied to  calculate subsidies.  This is  apparent from the definition of efficiency cost  of
subsidies, defined as the difference  between increase in consumer surplus and total subsidies.
If total subsidies were to be calculated  based on consumption  at non-subsidized  prices, total
subsidies would be less than increase in consumer surplus and welfare thus higher with a
subsidy.
Total subsidies by fuel and country are presented in Table 2 for 1991. It is important
to note that some countries, such as China and Indonesia have increased their energy prices
significantly  since 1991.  Other countries, in particular the states of the former Soviet Union,
are attempting to increase prices to international  levels but with less success because of high
levels of inflation. The former Soviet Union accounted  (and still accounts)  for more than two-
6Sectors include electricity generation, industry, transport,  agriculture, residential,
commercial and a residual sector.  Subsidies on outputs, such as electricity, or complement
inputs to fossil fuels in any of .hese sectors would act as "implicit" subisides on fossil fuels
because  more energy would  be used than at efficient input and output  prices. We do not attempt
to account for such inefficiencies.
6Table 2.  Total Subsidies  (miuHons  U.S.$)
Coal  Gias  Petroleum  Total  T )tal/
Former USSR  17000  63000  65000  14500C  10-13%'
China  3300  4600  7900  1.8%
Poland  66n0  1,O  6730  10.0%
Czechoslovakia  2100  460  380  2940  6.0%
Brazil  50  900  950  0.2%
Venezuela  1750  3600  5350  10.6%
Mexico  90  600  1550  2150  1.0%
India  2550  4250  6800  2.3%
Indonesia  5100  5100  5.0%
Saudi  Arabia  5000  5000  4.8%
South Korea  1650  1100  2750  1.2%
South Africa  1550  1550
Egypt  350  3000  3350  10.7%
Iran  2300  9100  11400  8.u%
Romania  600  800  1400  3.7%
Bulgaria  750  450  1200  6.0%
Total  36190  69440  104030  209660
Source:  Author's calculations.
tAssuming per capita  income in the range of US $4000-5000.thirds of the total worla subsidies, about US $145 billion. This is not unexpected  given the low
domestic prices relative to world prices, and the fact that the former Soviet Union consumes
approximately  20% of world fossil fuel consumption. Iran follows  wita the second  highest  level
of energy su,sidies, about US $11 billion (in 1993). These subsidies  are estimated  based on an
exchange rate after recent substantial devaluations  that were brought about to correct for a
significantly  overvalued currency.  China follows with the third highest level of subsidies of
about US $8 billion, although  diminishing. Subsidies  in China are difficult to estimate because
of a multiple pricing system. Coal subsidies  in China were significantly  higher a fe." years ago
(Bates and Moore 1992) before the two-tier pricing system was introduced  that permits a large
proportion of coal to be traded at market prices.  Subsidies  on petroleum  products, in total US
dollars, were still significant  in 1991. .r:ces  of gasoline and diesel to the transport sector have
for several years been above world prices, but diesel is subsidized  to agricuilture  and fuel oils
in particular to the industrial sector.  However, both coal and petroleum product subsidies in
China are rapidly being reduced and our estimate of US $8 billion in subsidies  could well be
significantly lower at this time  in  1993.  After China follows India, Poland, Venezuela,
Indonesia  and Saudi Arabia' with subsidies  in the range of US $5-7 billion, although  Indonesia
has by now significantly  reduced subsidies.
In terms of subsidies by fuel for the world as a whole, petroleum  products are heaviest
7In the case of Saudi Arabia, one may argue that the opportunity cost of domestically
consumed petroleum products is not world prices if annual exports are constrained (OPEC)
and if exports at world prices contain a  large rent element.  On the other hand, selling
petroleum products at lower than world prices may still be considered a subsidy because
domestically  consumed petroleum products could alternatively  be exported at world prices in
the future.  Thus there are  intertemporal inefficiencies  unless world prices are to decline
significantly  in the future.
8subsidized  accounting  for more than 50% of total subsidies, followed  by natural gas (33%) and
coal (17%).  Among petroleum  products fuel oils receive  the largest subsidies in dollar value.
Gasoline is often tzxed  even in countries  with substantial  subsidies  on other petroleum  products.
The largest  coal subsidizers  are the former  Soviet Union,  P3and, China, India, Czechoslovakia,
South Korea and South Africa (Table 3).  More than one half of total coal subsidies  are to coal
to the power sector.  The largest natural gas subsidizers  are the former Soviet Union, Iran and
Venezuela  (Table 4).  The largest petroleum  product subsidizers  are the former Soviet Union,
Iran, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, China, India, Venezuela  and Egypt (Table 5).  All petroleum
products (i.e. gasoline, kerosene, diesel, heavy and light fuel oils) are subsidized in the former
Soviet Union, Indonesia  (not gasoline  in 1993),  Venezuela,  Saudi  Arabia, Iran and Egypt, while
gasoline prices are siginificantly  above world prices in India, Czechoslovakia,  Brazil and South
Korea.  About 60% of petroleum  product subsidies in India, about 35% in Indonesia  and 33%
in Egypt are to kerosene. In total, world fossil fuel subsidies  are about US $210 billion, and
possibly US $10 billion more from the countries for which  no data were obtained.  This leaves
us with subsidies  in the range of US $210-220  billion, which  corresponds  to 20-25  % of the value
of world fossil fuel consumption  at current world prices.  Such large fossil fuel subsidies have
significant  fiscal implications  in many of the larger subsidizing  countries  and are thus important
in a macroeconomic  context.  Fossil fuel subsidies  are higher than 10% of GDP in the former
Soviet Union, Egypt, Venezuela  and Poland, while "only"  2.3% and 1.8% of GDP in India and
China respectively  (Table 2).
Estimates of total world subsidies  are 5-10% lower than estimated in Larsen and Shah
(1992c).  This is primarily because estimated subsidies  in the former Soviet Union are 15%
9Table 3.  Subsidies  to Coal (billion  US $)
Sectors:  Power  Industry  Trans  Agr  Conum  Res  Total  Pd/pw 
Former USSR  6.0  4.0  0.2  0.4  6.42  17.0  0.45
China  0.7  1.6  0.1  0.1  0.8  3.3  0.82
Poland  5.0  1.3  0.1  0.1  0.1  6.6  0.34
Czechoslovakia  1.0  0.3  0.8  2.1  0.25
India  1.9  0.5  0.15  2.55  0.62
South  Korea  1.65  1.65  0.403
South Africa  0.9  0.4  0.1  0.15  1.55  0.48
Romania  0.25  0.15  0.2  0.6  0.79
Bul -aria  0.5  0.1  0.15  0.75  0.45
Total  16.25  8.35  0.4  0.6  36.1
Source:  Author's calculations.
I/Ratio of weighted  average domestic  prices to world prices.
2/Commercial  and residential.
3/Residential  sector.Table  4.  Subsidies to Natural  Gas (billion US $)
Sectors:  Power  Industry  Trans  Agr  Comm  Res  Total  Pd/p"I
Former USSR  20.0  21.0  1.0  1.0  7.0  13.0  63.0  0.12
Czechoslovakia  0.35  0.11  0.46  0.85
Venezuela  0.4  1.0  0.35  1.75  0.15
Mexico  0.3  0.3  0.6  0.85
Egypt  0.35  0.35  0.48
Iran  0.7  0.6  1.0  2.3  0.05
Romania  0.2  0.2  0.4  0.8  0.84
Total  21.65  23.1  1.0  1.0  7.35  15.16  69.26
Source:  Author's calculations.
I/Ratio of weighted  average domestic  prices to world  prices.Table 5.  Subsidies to Petroleum Products (billion US.  $)'
Gasoline  Kerosene  Diesel  HFO*  LFO*  Total
Former USSR  19.0  1.0  30.0  5.0  10.0  65.0
(0.54)  (0.40)  (0.30)  (0.68)  (0.23)
China  1.5-  0.6  2.5  4.6
(0.70)  (0  70)  (0.79)
Czechoslovakia  0.38  0.38
(2.34)  (1.88)  (1.05)  (0.74)
Brazil  0.1  0.4  0.4  0.9
(1.95)  (0.74)  (0.94)  (1 41)  (0.71)
Venezuela  2.3  0.2  0.6  0.1  0.4  3.6
(0.25)  (0.47)  (0.18)  (0.55)  (0.19)
Mexico  0.2  0.85  0.4  0.1  1.55
(1.06)  (0.72)  (0.71)  (0.84)  (0.75)
India  2.55  1.3  0.4  4.25
(2.09)  (0.33)  (0.79)  (1.60)  (0.61)
Indonesia  0.6  1.8  1.3  1.4  5.1
(0.65)  (0.28)  (0.39)  (1.00)  (0.36)
Saudi Arabia  1.1  0.1  0.8  0.5  2.5  5.0
(0.65)  (0.22)  (0.13)  (0.47)  (0.12)
South Korea  0.3  0.3  0.5  1.1
(1.84)  (0.74)  (0.83)  (1.05)  (0.68)
Egypt  0.6  1.0  0.2  0.1  1.1  3.0
(0.34)  (0.05)  (0.05)  (0.95)  (0.40)
Iran  1.7  3.8  1.5  2.1  9.1
(0.29)  (0.05)  (0.07)  (0.04)
Bugaria  0.15  0.1  0.2  0.45
(1.29)  (0.60)  (0.90)  (1.80)  (0.75)
Total  25.3  7.4  41.2  8.3  22.0  104.1
Source: Author's calculations.
* Heavy Fuel Oils and Light Fuel Oils respectively.
**  Primarily  to agriculture  (no diesel subsidies  to transport).
I/Figures in parentheses are ratio of domestic  prices to world  prices.lower than previously estimated. The main reason.is that exchange rate and price data used in
this paper on the former Soviet Union  is from 1989, rather than 1992, to avoid the problem of
high inflation and associated exchange rate uncertainty in recent years.  In any case total
subsidies  in the former Soviet Union  are in the range of US $145-172  billion. Estimates  of total
subsidies  are for some  countries  significantly  different  than  estimated  in Larsen  and Shah (1992c)
primarily due to exchange  rate fluctuations,  domestic  price changes  and a more detailed data set
used in this paper.  Estimates in this study of subsidies  on petroleum products in Brazil and
Mexico and on coal in Czechoslovakia  are  significantly lower than the previous estimate.
Subsidies in Argentina are now virtually non-existent  due to the recent introduction  of a new
currency. Subsidies  on petroleum  products  are estimated  to be significantly  higher in Indonesia,
Saudi Arabia and Egypt, and on coal and petroleum  products in India relative to the previous
estimates.  Estimates for China, Poland and South Africa are almost identical to  previous
estimates.  Finally, estimates  for South Korea, Iran, Romania  and Bulgaria are included  in this
study.
III. EmRirical  framework:
The approach taken here is in partial equilibrium assuming factor prices, other than
energy prices, and level of aggregate output in the economy are constant.  This may be an
acceptable  approximation  for small changes  in energy  prices. For large changes  in energy  prices
however, as is evaluated in this paper, a country specific general equilibrium analysis is of
course preferable but beyond the scope of this study given that the analysis extends to  16
countries.  At best, estimated emission reductions from fossil fuel subsidy elimination  alert to
13the priority subsidy elimination should take in any strategy to reduce national and global
greenhouse gases.
The quantity  of energy  demanded  is considered  derived demand, i.e., energy is an input
in the production of goods and services. We assume there exists a twice differentiable  aggregate
production function,
Q =  f(K, L, E, M, t)  (1)
where Q is gross output, K is capital stock. L is labor input, E is energy input, M is material
input, and t is technical  change. Assuming  exogenously  given input prices, output level and cost
minimizing  behavior, the theory of duality  implies  existence  of a unique  twice differentiable  cost
function,
C  =  rPK,  PL,  PE, pM, Qp  (2)
where C is total cost and Pi's are the respective input price indices.  If the cost function is
weakly separable in its aggregate  inputs, then an energy function can be written as,
E =  E(qc, q0, qp)  (3)
where qi's are the primary energies (here fossil fuels)  coal, natural gas, and petroleum  products
respectively.  Assuming that E is homothetic  with respect to q, for i=C,  G, P,  we have the
energy cost function,
PE =  P(PC,  PG,  PP)  (4)
where Pc, PG,  and Pp are prices of coal, natural gas and petroleum products respectively.
Estimation of the impact  of subsidy removal on fossil fuel demand is carried out in two
stages.  First, we hold aggregate  energy constant, apply Shephard's lemma to each fossil fuel
and differentiate  each fuel input  with respect to each fuel price.  This gives the price elasticities
14of fuel demand, ejj, for fuel i and fuel price j such.that,
S  =  Sjeji  for all i, j  (5)
and
Ej  =0  for all i  (6)
where Sij are the fuel cost shares in total energy cost.  (5) results from the symmetry of the
Hessian matrix of second order derivatives  of the energy cost function and (6) from the linear
homogeneity  of the cost function.  Second,  we allow aggregate  energy E (as well as K, L and
M) to adjust to energy price changes while output is still held constant.  This gives the price
elasticities,
ejj  =  eij +  EEESj  for all i, j  (7)
where eEE  is the own price elasticity  of aggregate  energy.
In order to estimate  the impact  of fossil fuel subsidy  removal, we will assume values for
the own price elasticity of aggregate  energy and the own price elasticity for each fuel holding
aggregate  energy  constant. Since we are considering  fossil fuels only, of which there are three,
the elasticities  from (7) is a three-by-three  matrix of which three of the,  entries will be assumed.
That leaves  six unknowns,  which  are determined  by the system of six equations  in six unknowns
given by (5) and (6).  Thus the off-diagonal  entries in the elasticity matrix, i.e. the cross-price
elasticities, are uniquely determined  from the own price elasticities 8.
We have not assumed  any particular technology  in (1) and therefore not a specific form
for the energy function. We approximate  the energy demand function in the relevant region by
8Note that this is not the case if we have more than three fuels.
15a Cobb-Douglas  function, i.e. the price elasticity of demand for fuel i, ej, is constant in the
relevant region.  Taking partial derivatives with respect to energy prices of the Cobb-Douglas
function in logaritmic  form would give the estimated  changes in energy demand from a price
change.  But the derivative is a linear approximation,  while we will estimate changes in energy
demand from subsidy removal  by a movement  along the demand curve.  The change in energy
demanded  from subsidy removal is thus,
A  qi=-,  qi (1 - t  pi)  -X})  (8)
where qi is domestic  consumption  of fossil fuel i, pj is the domestic  price of fuel j before subsidy
removal, pjw  is the world price of fuel  j.  The impact  on carbon emissions is calculated  from (8)
by multiplying  the change in fuel i by the respective  carbon emission coefficients. It should be
noted that an implicit  assumption is that the energy markets are in equilibirum for the energy
prices used in this study, i.e.,  that energy consumption  has fully adjusted to past energy price
changes.  This may of course not be the case for countries with recent domestic energy price
adjustments. In case domestic  energy prices have recently been adjusted upwards, reductions
in consumption  may not yet be realized, as in the case of China, and our estimates  understates
the new equilibirum energy consumption  after subsidy removal.
IV. Implications for greenhouse gas emissions:  Removal of fossil fuel subsidies would be
expected to induce reductions in fossil fuel consumption and therefore carbon emissions in
subsidizing countries.  If domestic prices are below world prices because of price ceilings
effective for producers as well as consumers, then removal of such price ceilings may have
16positive supply effects.  In the case of non-traded energy products, in particular electricity,
demand  may be supply  constraint. Removing  subsidies,  or price ceilings, may therefore increase
consumption. We do not take this into account, but recognize  the importance  of this fact.
Reductions  in fossil fuel demand in subsidizing  countries may also reduce world prices
and thus result in increased  consumption  in non-subsidizing  countries. We will estimate  carbon
reductions assuming no change in world prices, although  this assumption  may be unrealistic if
all fossil fuel subsidies were removed simultaneously.
The removal of subsidies will not immidiately  translate into reductions in fossil fuel
consumption. Consumers will respond to higher prices over time, and we have thus estimated
reductions as below projected baseline emissions in year 2010, i.e. below projected  emissions
if subsidies  were not removed  (table 6).  Projected  baseline  emissions for the world as a whole
is estimated  to be about 50% higher in 2010 than in 1989. OECD  emissions are assumed to be
constant given that most OECD countries  have committed  to stabilize emissions at 1990 levels
by year 2000 and some to further reduce emissions to 80% of 1990 emission levels by year
2005.  Baseline  emission projections in the former Soviet Union and eastern Europe are based
on Baron (1992).  His estimates incorporate the impacts of restructuring, i.e. compositional
changes in aggregate output.  Baseline  emissioni  projections  for all other non-OECD countries
are based  on GDP projections  less 0.5-1.0% annual  autonomous  energy  efficiency  improvements
that may arise from less energy intensive capital, appliances and transport equipment, and
compositional  changes in aggregate  output.
The magnitude  of carbon reductions  realized by removal of fossil fuel subsidies  clearly
depends on the price elasticities  of demand. Bohi (1981) presents a comprehensive  survey of
17price elasticities  of energy demand. Long run own price elasticities  are in the range of -0.5 to -
1.0  for natural gas, -0.7 to -1.5 for petroleum products, -0.5 to -1.0 for coal and -0.5 to -1.0
for electricity.  Hoeller and Wallin (1991) estimates the long-run price elasticity of carbon
demand to -1.04 in a cross sectional study of the OECD countries.  These elasticity estimates
woulvd  be valid for marginal changes in prices only.  In cases of high levels of subsidies, as in
for example the former Soviet Union, elasticity  estimates  for marginal price changes  can not be
applied to arrive at emission reductions  but instead  much smaller values of elasticities  must be
considered.  Therefore own price elasticities  of demand used are in the range of -0.15 to -0.25
in most of these cases and -0.6 in cases of low levels of subsidies.  The analysis attempts to
include estimation  of interfuel  substitution  and cross price elasticities  are determined within the
model. Estimates of emission reductions from the removal of subsidies can also be in serious
error for countries  where supply  is completely  inelastic  with excess demand  at low prices as may
be the case in particular for natural gas.  In Poland, natural gas may be considered supply
constrained and therefore an increase in natural gas prices within a certain range may not have
any significant effect on natural gas consumption. Excluding  emission reductions from Poland
on account of natural gas would lead only to a minor revision in the overall estimate for
reductions in global  carbon emissions. In the case of Soviet Union, the share of natural gas in
total energy consumption  is as large as that of petroleum  products and coal and it is therefore
perhaps realistic to assume that price increases of natural gas will lead to reduced natural gas
consumption.
Estimates  of carbon  emission  reductions  from subsidiy  removal  are presented by country
in Table 6.  Removal  of subsidies  are estimated  to result in almost 7% reduction in world carbon
8Table 6. C02  Emissions Reductions
C02  Baseline  C02  C02  %  C02
emissions  emissons  emissions  reduction  emissions
1989  2010  2010 w/o  relative to  2010 relative
(mill tons)  (mill tons)  subsidies  baseline  to 1989
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (3)/(l)
World  21093  32784  30480  7.0%  1.5
OECD  9717  9717  9717  1.0
Non-OECD  11376  23067  20763  10.0%  1.8
Non-OECD  w/o  9090  16698  14681  12.1%  1.6
China
Former USSR  3697  5065  3798  25.0%  1.03
China  2286  6369  6082  4.5%  2.7
Poland  433  511  389  24.0%  0.9
India  632  1815  1652  9.0%  2.5
South Africa  274  510  439  14.0%  1.6
Czechoslovakia  221  221  168  24.0%  0.8
Mexico  304  693  669  3.5%  2.2
Brazil  193  439  428  2.5%  2.2
South Korea  206  700  672  4.0%  3.3
Venezuela  86  159  124  22.0%  1.4
Indonesia  106  326  304  7.0%  2.9
Saudi Arabia  162  271  239  12.0%  1.5
Egypt  75  208  175  16.0%  2.3
Iran  157  358  272  24.0%  1.7
Roniania  205  246  192  22.0%  0.9
Bulgaria  104  125  111  11.0%  1.1
(2) Projected  emissions if fossil fuel subsidies  are not removed.
(3) Projected  emissions if fossil fuel subsidies  are removed.dioxide emissions  from fossil fuel consumption,  of which  56% are from coal, 30% from gas and
14% from petroleum products.  In terms of potential  reductions in national  carton emissions,
reductions are  estimated to  be  larger  than 20%  in  the  former  Soviet Union,  Poland,
Czechoslovakia,  Iran, Romania  and Venezuela. Such large reductions  may appear  unrealistically
high, but even after such reductions  carbon intensity  (tons of carbon to GDP) in these countries
would still be significantly  higher than in OECD  countries or other middle income countries.
Perhaps interesting, total  carbon dioxide emission reductions from  reductions in
consumption of petroleum r)roducts are significa 1ltly  lower than for coal and natural gas,
primarily  because  percentage  change  in domestic  petroleum  product  end-user  prices from subsidy
removal is smaller than for coal and gas prices, although  total value of subsidies  to petroleum
products is far higher than to coal and gas.  Total value of subsidies to petroleum products is
higher in large part because subsidies  per unit of carbon  content is higher on petroleum  products
due to higher world prices and non-subsidized  end-user prices of petroleum products per unit
of carbon content relative to coal and to some  extent gas.  Emission reductions from gas is also
higher than from petroleum products  because  domestic  prices of gas relative to world prices are
lower  than for petroleum  products  in the former  Soviet Union, from where the largest  reductions
in emissions from gas are estimated to occur.  In terms of total world emission reductions,
estimates in this study are lower than the previous emstimates primarily because of lower
estimates of  reductions from petroleum products in  the  former Soviet Union.  Although
estimated  emission reductions  from petroleum  products  are as high as 18%  of petroleum  product
emissions, total emission reductions are only 2% because of the large share of coal in total
emissions.
20In terms of the other countries, estimated  emission  reductions  in Mexico  are substantially
lower than estimated in Larsen and Shah (1992c)  even subsidies, although small in total value,
to coal and gas are now included. The reason is that petroleum  product subsidies, estimated  at
official exchange rate, are significantly reduced resulting in an estimated slight increase in
petroleum  product consumption  from interfuel sLbstitution. Emission  reductions in Brazil are
also substantially lower due to signifiLantly  lower estimates of petroleum product subsidies.
Estimated  reductions  in Indonesia  are also substantially  lower, although  estimated  total subsidies
to petroleum  prodeucts  are now higher. Reductions  are lower because  estimates  suggest  relatively
large increase in coal and gas consumption from removal of petroleum product subsidies.
Estimated reductions  in Saudi  Arabia and Egypt are signi:icantly  higher according  to this study
because  of substantially  larger estimated  subsidies. Estimated  reductions in Czechoslovakia  are
now larger primarily due to larger estimated reductions in coal conumption and inclusion of
subsidies  to gas. Estimated  reductions  in Venezuela  are now  larger because significant  subsidies
to gas are included. Estimated  total reductions  in India, Poland and South Africa are relatively
close to previous estimates.  Finally, this study includes estimates for South Korea, Iran.
Rom.'nia and Bulgaria, which were not included in Larsen and Shah (1992c).
V. Summarv  and conclusions:  Substantial  energy subsidies  prevail in a handful  of large carbon
emitting countries.  Total world subsidies  are estimated to be in excess of US $210 billion, or
20-25% of the value of world fossil fuel consumption at world prices.  Removal of such
subsidies  are estimated  to reduce  national  carbon  emissions  in some countries  by more than 20%
and reduce global  carbon emissions  by almost 7% assuming  no change in world prices of fossil
fuels.  If all subsidies are eliminated simultaneously, world prices of fossil fuels may he
21expected to decline relative to the price path of no subsidy  removal.  A decline in world prices
could stimualate  demand in non-subsidizing  countries and partially offset estimated reductions
in carbon emissions.  On the outer hand, a decline in world prices would only have a minor
effect on most national emission  reductions in subsidizing  countries estimated  in this paper (see
Larsen and Shah 1992c).
It should be noted that subsidy removal would not be sufficient to stabilize aggregate
carbon emissions at 1989 levels in non-OECD countries.  In particular, the share of world
emissions from China will increase from about i0% in 1989 to 20% in 2010 even if fossil fuel
subsidies are removed.  Stronger economic p',licy responses would be required to achieve
stabilization,  although emission reductions in some individual  countries from subsidy removal
would be significant.
The paper does point to the fact that substantial  fossil fuel subsidies  exist in a handful  of
large carbon emitting countries, although  subsidies  are being  phased out, or being attempted, in
some of these coutries.  Further research should include the electricity sector with explicit
consideration to supply constraints, a more country specific model, broader energy strategy
options for China and India given their current share of global carbon emissions and rapidly
increasing  share in the future, and the impact of energy subsidy removal on world prices.
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